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NOTES
Claim Requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal
Notice Or Substantial Documentation?
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Tort Claims Act 1 (FTCA) allows persons injured by
negligent federal employees acting within the scope of their employment to sue the federal government. 2 Before Congress amended the
FTCA in 1966,3 an injured party seeking less than $2,500 in damages
could either file a claim with the offending agency or sue the government directly. 4 A party seeking more than $2,500 had no choice but
to file suit. 5 Congress amended the FTCA6 in order to encourage
claims settlement,7 to reduce court congestion, 8 and to minimize the
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) provides that:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against
the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
3. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306 (1966).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. II 1965-66); cf.
Schlingman v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 454, 455 (S.D. Cal. 1963) ("The filing of an administrative claim is not a prerequisite to filing or maintaining an action in this court, especially
when the demand is in excess of $2,500."). A claimant who chose to submit a claim to the
federal agency could withdraw the claim and file suit ifhe gave fifteen days written notice and
the agency had not yet made final disposition of the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1964),
amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (Supp. II 1965-66).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. II 1965-66); Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation: Hearings on H.R 13650,
13651, 13652, and 14182 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings) (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) ("[T]he present statutory scheme forces all tort claims over $2,500 to
become tort suits .••."); S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2516 [hereinafter cited as s. REP. No. 1327) ("For claims
over ($2,500], the individual has no alternative but to file suit.").
6. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306 (1966) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2401, 2671, 2672, 2675, 2677, 2678, 2679, 31 U.S.C. § 724(a), and 38 U.S.C.§4116 (1976)).
For additional discussion of the 1966 amendments, see Corboy, The Revised Federal Tori
Claims Act: A Practitioner's View, 2 FORUM 67 (1967); Corboy, Shielding the Plainl{/J's Achilles'
Heel· Tori Claim Notices lo Governmental Entities, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 609, 635-42 (1979);
Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1212-22
(1967); Pitard, Procedural Aspects ofthe Federal Tort Claims A cl, 21 LOY. L. REV. 899, 899-905
(1975); Silverman, The Ins and Outs ofFiling a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 J.
AIR. L. CoM. 41 (1979); Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Administrative Claims, 20
BAYLOR L. REV. 336 (1968); Comment,Adminislralive Claims and the Substitution ofthe United
Stales as Defendant Under the Federal Drivers Act: The Catch 22 of the Federal Tort Claims
Act?, 29 EMORY L.J. 755, 764-68 (1980).
1. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney Gen-
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cost of processing claims. 9 Specifically, Congress amended 28 U.S.C.
section 2672 10 to instruct the Attorney General to promulgate regulations governing the handling and settlement of tort claims. 11 Congress also changed section 2675(a) 12 to state that "[a]n action shall
not be instituted upon a claim against the Unite9- States . . . unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate
Federal agency . . . ."13
This administrative claim requirement demands that an injured
party properly present the claim within the FTCA's two-year limitations period. 14 Failure to do so deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over any subsequent suit based on the claim. 15 Unfortunately,
eral) ("The possibility of an early settlement without a lawsuit is advantageous . . . ,") (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNo. & Ao.
NEWS at 2517 ("meritorious (claims] can be settled more quickly"); see notes 41-57 infra and
accompanying text.
8. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) ("[O]ne of the primary objectives [of this bill] is to reduce unnecessary congestion in the
courts."); S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CON0, & AD.
NEWS at 2518 ("Another objective of this bill is to reduce unnecessary congestion in the
courts.").
9. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) (plaintiff benefits because settlement entails no litigation expenses; government benefits
because settlements are usually "less expensive than judgments"); S. REP. No. 1327,supra note
5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG, & AD. NEWS at 2517 (minimizes need for "expensive and time-consuming litigation").
10. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, sec. 1, 80 Stat. 306, 306 (1966),
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976), provides in pertinent part that:
The head of each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, may consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise,
and settle any claim for money damages against the United States for injury or loss of
property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Congress also increased agency settlement authority from $2,500 to $25,000 ''to make the administrative settlements a meaningful thing." S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted
in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2518; see 28 u.s.c. § 2672 (1976).
12. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, sec. 2, 80 Stat. 306, 306 (1966).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976) states in full:
(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money
damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim
to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the
agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this
section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim,
or counterclaim.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b) (1976) provides that:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or
unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
15. E.g., Kielwien v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir.) ("The right to sue the
Government exists wholly by consent as expressed in § 2675, 28 U.S.C., which fixes the terms
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the interaction between private individuals and government claims
officers complicates the claim requirement. 16 In an FTCA action, the
claimant usually completes a Standard Form 95 17 and sends it to the
appropriate federal agency. After receiving the form, the claims officer will request documentation pursuant to the Department of Justice regulations. 18 If the injured party fails to provide all or part of
and conditions on which suit may be instituted. The first requirement is the filing of a claim.
That requirement is jurisdictional and is not waivable."), cert. den., 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Best
Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Requirement for an ad•
ministrative claim to be filed as a prerequisite under the Federal Tort Claims Act exemplifies
one such condition; since the claim must precede the suit, the requirement is jurisdictional and
cannot be waived.").
Courts ordinarily dismiss without prejudice suits filed by persons who fail to comply with
these jurisdictional prerequisites. However, if the court dismisses the suit after the FTCA's
two-year statute of limitations has run, the claim is barred. Robinson v. United States Navy,
342 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
16. For a variety of reasons, claimants often fail to respond to an agency's documentation
requests. See,e.g., Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608,610 (9th Cir. 1982); Tuckerv. United
States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1982); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445,
447 (6th Cir. 1981); Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D. Iowa 1981).
17. See Appendix A.
18. By authority granted under 28 U.S.C. §2672 (1976), the Attorney General promulgated
regulations governing the processing of claims filed with federal agencies. See 28 C.F.R.
§§ 14.1-14.11 (1982). 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2-14.4 are the only regulations relevant to this Note.
They define "presenting a claim," explain who may file a claim, and detail claim documenta•
tion requirements. These regulations are, in pertinent part:
28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1982) Administrative claim; when presented.
(a) For purposes of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 240l(b) and 2672, a claim shall be
deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant, his duly
authorized agent or legal representative, an executed Standard Form 95 or other written
notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain
for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or death alleged to have occurred by
reason of the incident.
28 C.F.R. § 14.3 (1982) Administrative claim; who may file.
(a) A claim for injury to or loss of property may be presented by the owner of the
property, his duly authorized agent or legal representative.
(b) A claim for personal injury may be presented by the injured person, his duly authorized agent, or legal representative.
(c) A claim based on death may be presented by the executor or administrator of the
dccendent's tJ'ic I estate, or by any other person legally entitled to assert such a claim in
accordance with applicable State law.
(d) A claim for loss wholly compensated by an insurer with the rights of a subrogee
may be presented by insurer. A claim for loss partially compensated by an insurer with
the rights of a subrogee may be presented by the parties individually as their respective
interests appear, or jointly.
(e) A claim presented by an agent or legal representative shall be presented in the
name of the claimant, be si~ed by the agent or legal representative, show the title or legal
capacity of the person signmg, and be accompanied by evidence of his authority to present a claim on behalf of the claimant as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian,
or other representative.
28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (1982) Administrative claims; evidence and information to be submitted.
(a) Death. In support of a claim based on death, the claimant may be required to
submit the following evidence or information:
(1) An authenticated death ccrtificat~ or other competent evidence showing cause of
death, date of death, and age of the decedent.
(2) Decedent's employment or occupation at time of death, including his monthly or
yearly salary or earnings (if any), and the duration of his last employment or occupation.
(3) Full names, addresses, birth dates; kinship, and marital status of the decedent's
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the requested information, the question arises whether he has propsurvivors, including identification of those survivors who were dependent for support
upon the decedent at the time of his death.
(4) Degree of support afforded by the decedent to each survivor dependent upon him
for support at the time of his death.
(5) Decedent's general physical and mental condition before death.
(6) Itemized bills for medical and burial expenses incurred by reason of the incident
causing death, or itemized receipts of payment for such expenses.
(7) If damages for pain and suffering prior to death are claimed, a physician's detailed
statement specifying the injuries suffered, duration of pain and suffering, any dru~ administered for pain, and the decedent's physical condition in the interval between mjury
and death.
(8) Any other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the responsibility of the United States for the death or damages claimed.
(b) Personal injury. In support of a claim for personal injury, including pain and suf•
fering, the claimant may be required to submit the following evidence or information:
(1) A written report by his attending physician or dentist setting forth the nature and
extent of the injury, nature and extent of treatment, any degree of temP?rary or perma•
nent disability, the prognosis, period of hospitalization, and any dimirushed earnmg ca•
pacity. In addition, the claimant may be required to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician employed by the agency or another Federal agency. A copy
of the report of the examining physician shall be made available to the claimant upon the
claimant's written request provided that he has, upon request, furnished the report re•
ferred to in the first sentence of this paragraph and has made or agrees to make available
to the agency any other physician's reports previously or thereafter made of the physical
or mental condition which is the subject matter of his claim.
(2) Itemized bills for medical, dental, and hospital expenses incurred, or itemized re•
ceipts of payment for such expenses.
(3) If the prognosis reveals the necessity for future treatment, a statement of expected
expenses for such treatment.
(4) If a claim is made for loss of time from employment, a written statement from his
employer showing actual time lost from employment, whether he is a full or part-time
employee, and wages or salary actually lost.
(5) If a claim is made for loss of income and the claimant is self-employed, documen•
tary evidence showing the amounts of earnings actually lost.
(6) Any other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the respon•
sibility of the United States for the personal injury or the damages claimed.
(c) Property damage. In support of a claim for injury to or loss of property, real or
personal, the claimant may be required to submit the following evidence or information:
(1) Proof of ownership.
(2) A detailed statement of the amount claimed with respect to each item of property.
(3) An itemized receipt of payment for necessary repairs or itemized written estunates
of the cost of such repairs.
(4) A statement listing date of purchase, purchase price and salvage value, where re•
pair is not economical.
(5) Any other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the respon•
sibility of the United States for the injury to or loss of property or the damages claimed.
The regulation's requirements for presenting a claim apply both to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), the
statute of limitations provision, and to 28 U.S.C. § 2672, which authorizes promulgation of
claim processing regulations. See notes 11 & 14 supra for the text of these sections,
The Attorney General added the last sentence of §14.2(b)(l) to clarify that claims are
"presented" only when received by the appropriate agency. See 46 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (1981),
Individual agencies may promulgate their own FTCA regulations, but these must be consistent
with Justice Department regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.11 (1982),
''There has been disagreement in the federal courts whether these provisions establish the
requirement for a proper presentation of a claim pursuant to section 2675 or whether they only
outline procedures for settlement negotiations under section 2672." Note, Federal Tori Claims
Act: Notice of Claim Reljtliremenl, 61 MINN. L. REV. 513, 520 (1982); see Avery v, United
States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982) (Justice Department regulations deal with an agency's
settlement authority and do not interpret §2675(a)); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445,
447-48 (6th Cir. 1981) (Justice Department regulations govern settlement proceedings, not fed•
eral jurisdictional prerequisites). However, this Note argues that because Congress intended
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erly "presented the claim" under section 2675 so as to toll the
FTCA's statute of limitations.
Courts addressing the issue disagree on the proper interpretation
of the legislative history of the FTCA amendments. 19 The First Circuit, in Sw!ft v. United States, 20 relied on Congress's intent to encourage presuit settlements in holding that claimants who fail to
comply with documentation requests have not properly presented a
claim.21 Thus, claims that are not adequately documented within
the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations are forever barred.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has since concluded in Adams v.
United States 22 that a claim for a sum certain23 need only provide
the 1966 amendments to improve settlement of claims, see notes 41-57 infra, the Justice Department settlement regulations necessarily infonn the definition of §2675's presentation
requirement.
19. Although "it is appropriate to begin with the language of the statute itself," Northwest
Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981), courts must rely instead on the
legislative history because the FfCA amendments do not themselves define "presented the
claim." See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976). Moreover, although "(a) fundamental canon of statutory construction is that . . . words (should) be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, co=on meaning," Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979), no court has relied on
the plain meaning of the "presented the claim" language. See, e.g., Avery v. United States,
680 F.2d 608,610 (9th Cir. 1982) ("the statute on its face does not provide a clear answer to the
problem before us").
When the words of a statute are ambiguous, as they are here, the courts should use the
legislative history to ascertain what Congress intended. United States v. Public Utils.
Commn., 345 U.S. 295,315 (1953). Even if the words of the statute did have a plain meaning,
that meaning might still yield ''to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979); accord, United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). Similarly, other authorities indicate that courts should not
rely too heavily on the plain meaning rule. See, e.g., Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918)
("A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used."); Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) ("it is one of the surest indexes of a
mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary"), qffd , 326
U.S. 404 (1945); Murphy, Old Maxims Never JJie: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1317 (1975) ("[Statutory construction] questions cannot be answered by the simple-minded formulae often advanced, including the plain meaning rule.").
20. 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs husband died of a heart attack shortly after
having an automobile accident with a Forest Service employee. Counsel submitted plaintiffs
two million dollar claim for personal injury, loss of consortium, and wrongful death, but ignored the agency's repeated documentation requests. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding that the plaintiffs claim should be dismissed as premature.
21. 614 F.2d at 814 (" 'The purpose of requiring preliminary administrative presentation of
a claim is to permit a government agency to evaluate and settle the claim at an early stage
. . . .' ") (quoting Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)). The
First Circuit also upheld the district court's conclusion that an agency can demand supporting
information pursuant to Justice Department regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2(a) and 14.4. 614
F.2d at 814. For a discussion of the problems that this approach creates, see notes 58-71 infra
and accompanying text.
22. 615 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed suit against the Air
Force, alleging that Air Force physicians negligently delivered their child. The child suffered
severe brain damage during birth, allegedly due to an oxygen deficiency. Plaintiffs submitted a
completed Standard Form 95, see Appendix A, and claimed a sum certain. However, they did
not submit requested supporting documentation and failed to include information regarding
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the affected agency with notice24 and that a second policy of the 1966
amendments - promoting fair treatment of claimants - prevents
federal agencies from requiring claim documentation. 25 Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit held that undocumented claims that provide the
agency with notice sufficient to permit investigation satisfy section
2675's presentation requirement and preserve the injured party's
ability to sue.26 Three other circuits have since adopted the Adams
interpretation of the amendment's legislative history. 27
This Note finds both the Adams and Sw!ft positions unsatisfactory. Part I contends thatAdams misconstrued the legislative history
of the FTCA amendments by applying a mioim::tl notice standard
future expenses. The parties disputed whether the Air Force possessed or had access to the
information demanded. The district court deemed this question irrelevant and ruled that the
claimants, to perfect their claim, should have informed the Air Force that they had not incurred any unreported medical expenses and should also have provided an estimate of future
medical expenses. It then held that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the administrative claim requirement and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. See 615 F.2d at 285-86. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, stating that an injured party meets the claim requirement of§ 2675 if he or
she "(I) gives the agency written notice of [the] claim sufficient to enable the agency to investigate and (2) places a value on [the] claim." 615 F.2d at 289. The court did not base its holding
on the assumption that the Air Force already had the information.
23. The Adams court required a claimant to "place( ] a value on his or her claim." 615
F.2d at 289. This precondition derives from section 2675(b), which states that "(a]ction under
this section shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented
to the federal agency . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1976). Courts have universally recognized
this sum certain requirement. See, e.g., Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 272 (7th Cir.
1981) (per curiam) ("It is well settled that a Standard Form 95 filed with the 'amount of claim'
omitted is invalid. Likewise, a separate claim notice submitted without a specific dollar
amount is ineffective."); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971) (dismissing
suit because, among other things, plaintiff had not claimed sum certain damages).
Most of the litigation regarding the sum certain requirement involves claims that contain
qualified amounts. See, e.g., Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268,273 (7th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (personal injury claim for "149.42 presently" states a sum certain); Fallon v. United
States, 405 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Mont. 1976) (personal injury claim for "approximately
$15,000.00" states a sum certain); cf. Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974)
(personal injury claim for an amount "unknown at this time" does not state a sum certain and
thus failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 2675).
24. 615 F.2d at 288-89.
25. 615 F.2d at 288, 291.
26. 615 F.2d at 289.
21. See Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker v. United States
Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1982); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445 (6th Cir.
I 98 I). Although none of the plaintiffs in these cases contended that the agency already possessed the requested information, the court in each instance applied the Adams standard. See
note 22supra. At least one district court in the Eighth Circuit has accepted the Adams documentation standard. See Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (N.D. Iowa 1981).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet decided a case directly on point. It has,
however, strongly suggested that it will follow Adams when given the opportunity. See Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 271 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Notwithstanding
Erxleben's implication, at least one district court in the Seventh Circuit has since declined to
follow Adams. See Howard v. United States, No. 81 C 3856 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1982) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). One district court in the Second Circuit has also refused
to apply the Adams standard. Pollitt v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 3883 (HFW) (S,D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
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and then argues that Swfft contravenes the amendments' fairness
policy by permitting ambiguous, overreaching documentation requests. Part II contends that courts should interpret section 2675's
"presented the claim" language as an accommodation between two
competing Congressional objectives: presuit claims settlement and
fair treatment of claimants. The Note proposes that until the Department of Justice modifies its current claims regulations, 28 courts
should toll the statute of limitations whenever an individual's claim
includes the information requested on Standard Form 95. However,
the statute of limitations should begin to run again if the claimant
fails to comply with unambiguous documentation requests that demand information ordinarily discoverable tinder the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
I.

CURRENT APPROACHES: MINIMAL NOTICE AND
DOCUMENTATION

Both Adams and Swfft relied on the legislative history of the
FTCA amendments to support their respective interpretations of the
administrative claim requirement. Neither interpretation is correct
because both promote only one of the goals of the amendments, instead of encouraging both presuit settlement and fair treatment of
claimants.
A. Minimal Notice: Misconstruing Legislative Intent

Adams and other courts29 adopting a minimal notice standard
base their position on two aspects of the legislative history. First,
according to these courts, the Senate Report accompanying the 1966
amendments30 indicates that Congress patterned the claim requirement after state and municipal statutes, which require only minimal
notice.31 Second, these courts reason that a minimal notice standard
furthers the amendments' policy of promoting fair treatment of
claimants without impeding Congress's intent to promote presuit settlement of claims.32 Neither argument is persuasive.
28. See note 18 supra; cf. note 98 i,ifra.
29. See note 27 supra.
30. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515.
The House Report on the FfCA amendments bill, H.R. Rep. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), contains wording almost identical to the Senate Report. For this reason, and because
the courts refer only to the Senate Report, this Note will cite the Senate Report as authority for
the legislative history of the FfCA amendments.
31. See Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker v. United
States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. I982);Adams, 615 F.2d at 289.
32. Avery, 680 F.2d at 611; Tucker, 616 F.2d at 958;Adams, 615 F.2d at 289.
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I. State and Municipal Statutes

Senate Report No. 1327 establishes that Congress intended to
emulate state and municipal statutes when it enacted the 1966
amendments;33 however, the inference supported by Congress's reliance on these statutes is not clear. The Adams court observed that
the municipal statutes cited by the Senate Report often require only
"notice of an accident within a fixed time,"34 and reasoned that Congress intended that similar minimal notice would satisfy section
2675's administrative claim requirement.35 However, a critical examination of the entire legislative history reveals that Congress never
intended that its reference to municipal statutes would govern the
definition of "presented the claim." Instead, the Senate Report cited
those statutes simply as precedent for the administrative claim requirement itself.
Two arguments support this interpretation. The first turns on the
Senate Report's presentation of the state statutes. The Report states
at the outset of its discussion of these statutes that "[t]he requirement
of an administrative claim as a prerequisite to suit has numerous
33. The relevant Senate Report passage states that:
The requirement of an administrative claims as prerequisite to suit has numerous
precedents in statutes governing tort claims against municipalities. These laws often provide that a municipality must be given notice of an accident within a fixed time. The
purpose of this notice has been summarized as being"* * * to protect the municipality from the expense of needless litigation, give it an
opportunity for investigation, and allow it to adjust differences and settle claims without
suit (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), section 53.153)."
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 1-923 of the District of Columbia
Code includes the following language concerning suits for damages caused by employees
driving vehicles" * * * No suit shall be instituted * * * unless the claimant shall have first given notice
to the District and shall have presented to the District in writing a claim for money damages in connection therewith, and the District has had 6 months from the date of such
filing within which to make final disposition of such claim * * *."
Another example of a precedent in State practice is to be found in the laws of the State
of Iowa (Laws of the 61st General Assembly, ch. 79 (Mar. 26, 1965)) which provide requirements very similar to those provided in H.R. 13650. This statute provides for tort
claims against the State oflowa and requires that a claim must first be presented to a State
appeal board and further includes language providing that no suit is permitted unless the
appeal board has made final disposition of the claim.
s. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3-4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at
2517-18; cf. Hearings, supra note 5, at 19 ("A number of States and municipalities which permit suits . . . require the filing of claims . . . in advance of the lawsuit. That is true in the
District of Columbia.").
34. 615 F.2d at 289 (quoting S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2517).
35. The court stated that "Congress deemed this minimal notice sufficient to inform the
relevant agency of the existence of a claim .••• This requisite minimal notice ••. promptly
informs the relevant agency of the circumstances of the accident so that it may investigate the
claim and respond either by settlement or by defense." 615 F.2d at 289. The court could have
reinforced this point by citing the House Hearings' only reference to notice. See Hearings,
supra note 5, at 20.
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precedents in statutes governing tort claims against municipalities."36
The Senate Report's subsequent discussion of notice37 must be read
in the context of this introductory statement, which indicates that the
state statutes were cited as support for, and not as a description of,
the proposed federal administrative claim requirement.
Second, the Report's approving reference to the District of Columbia and Iowa statutes38 supports the conclusion that Congress
cited those statutes merely as precedent for an administrative claim
requirement. Neither statute imposes the same requirements as the
FTCA,39 a fact that the Senate Report partially acknowledged. 40
This inconsistency between the Senate Report's mention of notice
and its citation of the two state statutes suggests that Congress never
considered the state statutes' definition of a claim requirement, but
rather intended to justify through precedent what was then a novel
federal administrative claim requirement.

2. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Senate Report No. 1327 indicates that the main purpose of the
1966 amendments was to encourage presuit settlements41 in order to
reduce litigation expenses42 and court congestion.43 Instead of construing the claim requirement in light of this objective, Adams relied
36. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2517 (emphasis added).
37. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2517-18; see note 33 supra.
38. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2517-18; see note 33 supra.
'
39. The D.C. Code requires claimants to provide notice to the District of Columbia in
accordance with § 12-309 and to present a claim for money damages. D.C. CooE ANN. § 11213 (1981). The Code defines notice in§ 12-309 as "the approximate time, place, cause, and
circumstances of the injury or damage." D.C. CooE ANN. § 12-309 (1981). The FrCA's claim
requirement differs from the D.C. Code's because neither section 2675(a) nor section 240l{b)
defines "presented the claim." See notes 13-14supra.
The Iowa statute also differs from the FfCA. Although neither statute explains what a
claimant must do to present a claim, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675(a), 240l{b); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 25.1 (West 1978), Iowa requires a claimant to file his claim with the state appeal board, IOWA
CODE ANN.-§ 25A.13, whereas the United States requires the claimant to file with the appropriate federal agency, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976).
40. s. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2517-18 ("[T]he State oflowa . . . provide[s] requirements very similar to those provided in
H.R. 13650.").
41. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2517 (the amendments increase the chance of "possible settlement before a court action"
because the agency will have the "best information concerning the activity which gave rise to
the claim"); see also Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant
Attorney General) ("The possibility of an early settlement" is increased.); 112 CONG. REc.
12,259 (1966) (statement of Representative Ashmore) (''The object, really, is to settle claims
• . . fairly expeditiously and prevent unnecessary lawsuits.").
42. S. REP. No. 1327,supra note 5, at 3,reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2517 (the amendments encourage the parties to settle cases and thus eliminate "the need for
filing suit and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation"); see also 112 CONG. REc.
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on the 1966 amendments' prefatory language, which states that the
FTCA amendments and three companion bills,44 "have the common
purpose of providing for more fair and equitable treatment of private individuals and claimants when they deal with the Government
or are involved in litigation with their Government."45 The Adams
court concluded that the goal of fairness would be frustrated if a
claimant were required to provide more information than was necessary to enable the agency to investigate the claim.46
The Adams court's reliance on the goal of fairness suffers from
two flaws. First, the court used the fairness policy to make compliance with government documentation requests voluntary,47 thus undermining the amendments' goal of providing the government with
information that could facilitate presuit settlement.48 The govern14,376 (1966) (statement of Senator Ervin) ("[M]eritorious claims would be settled more quickly, without the need for expensive and time-consuming litigation . . . .").
43. S. REP. No. 1321,supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2518 ("Another objective of this bill is to reduce unnecessary congestion in the courts.").
Before the 1966 amendments, the Attorney General could not settle claims without court
approval. The 1966 amendments abolished this requirement. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and
Government Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1219-20 (1967).
44. The three other bills sought to benefit private citizens vis-a-vis the government. The
first provided agencies with additional authority to compromise Government claims against
private individuals and to terminate or suspend collection efforts when the debtor-citizen lacks
all present or prospective ability to pay. See H.R. REP. No. 1533, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
The second imposed statutes of limitations for contract and tort actions initiated by the government against private individuals. See H.R. REP. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
The third allowed private individuals winning civil suits against the Government to collect
costs as part of awarded judgments. See H.R. REP. No. 1535, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The
three bills, all of which had been requested by the Justice Department, were eventually enacted by Congress. See Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-505, 80 Stat. 304 (1966); Act of
July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308 (1966); Act of July 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508,
80 Stat. 308 (1966).
45. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2515-16.
46. 615 F.2d at 289, 291-92.
47. 615 F.2d at 290 ("A claimant will ordinarily comply with 28 C.F.R. §§14.1-14.11 ifhe
or she wishes to settle his or her claim with the appropriate agency.") (emphasis added).
48. Many courts that have construed § 2675(a) to require documentation have recognized
the importance of supporting documentation to the presuit settlement process. See, e.g., Swift
v. United States, 614 F.2d at 814 ("(C]ounsel's failure to document the personal injury part of
the administrative claim precluded the agency from evaluating the entire claim for settlement
purposes."); Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("[T]he Government, at a minimum, is entitled to
sufficient information to enable it to evaluate the claim and choose between settlement and
litigation."); Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 17 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ("their failure to
furnish information on damages absolutely foreclosed the government from arriving at a rea•
sonable settlement figure").
Both plaintiffs and defendant's lawyers agree that responsible claim evaluation requires
more information than the Adams minimal notice standard can produce. See, e.g., P. HER•
MANN, BETTER SETTLEMENTS/ THROUGH LEVERAGE 170 (1965) (a wise lawyer for the plaintiff will itemize all medical bills having to do with a particular accidental injury, will furnish
copies of the bills to an insurance adjuster or defense counsel, and will attempt to secure an
employer's statement of time and wages lost); Faust, What Insurance Companies Want from
Claimant's Counsel lo Expedite Settlements, in NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS IN PERSONAL IN-
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ment needs information soon after it receives notice of the claim in
order to expedite settlement negotiations. In fact, the current regulations primarily request information that either determines whether
the claimant is the proper party to bring the claim or enables the
agency to assess the accuracy of the alleged damages. 49 Disclosure
of this information is essential to the policy of facilitating presuit
settlements.
Adams argued that a minimal notice requirement adequately encourages settlements because an agency can obtain through investigation the information needed to settle a case.50 This point is
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, agencies lack the resources 51 to
obtain information that the claimant can provide with little inconvenience.52 Second, most information requested under the current
regulations can be acquired through discovery after a suit is filed. 53
If the government requests information during discovery, the claimJURY ACTIONS 4, 5 (1956). (To judge the settlement value of the case, the insurance company
needs a doctor's certificate explaining plaintiff's injury, the name of the plaintiff's employer,
the type of work the plaintiff does and his wages, and a statement of the period of disability
claimed.); Frost, Compromising Cases Which Have Selllement Values of$500 to $1,500, in NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS 14, 15 (1956) (claimant's attorney
must provide the insurance company with "medical reports and itemized lists of special damages" if he wants to settle the claim); Lynch, Selllement of Civil Cases: A Viewfrom the Bench,
LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 8, 9 (settlement information required by insurance companies includes medical reports, verification of wages and copies of medical bills); Wormwood, Evaluation and Settlement of Claims, 38 Wis. B. BULL., Oct. 1965, at 7, 8-10. (Some of the more
important factors considered by the defense attorney before settlement discussions include:
medical and hospital expenses to date, future medical and hospital expenses, loss of earnings,
and, in death cases, dependency.).
49. See note 18 supra.
50. 615 F.2d at 289 ("minimal notice . . . promptly informs the relevant agency . . . so
that it may investigate the claim").
51. The sheer volume of claims renders effective independent investigation difficult. See
Volk, Processing and Negotiating the Military Medical Malpractice Claim, TRIAL, June 1982, at
51, 52 ("Unfortunately, the agency will do very little on your [medical malpractice] claim for
almost the entire six months. There simply are so many claims that until the six-month deadline begins to expire, the claim will not be worked.").
Of course, the fact that very little can be done on a medical malpractice claim does not
mean that an agency cannot process simpler claims more quickly. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra
note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2518-19 ("It is obvious that
there will be some difficult tort claims that cannot be processed and evaluated in [the] 6 month
period. The great bulk of them, however, should be ready for decision within this period.").
Cf. notes 54 & 56 infra and accompanying text.
52. See Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 17 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ("Such information was within the sole control of plaintiffs, and by withholding it they automatically frustrated the purpose of Congress in requiring an administrative claims procedure in the first
place.").
53. In general, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." FED. R. C1v. P.
26(b)(l). This provision has been liberally construed. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 177 (1979) (''The Court has more than once declared that the deposition-discovery rules
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials."); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297 (1969) ("[Rule 26(b)] has
been generously construed to provide a great deal of latitude for discovery."); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,507 (1947) ("We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are
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ant or his attorney will be forced to provide the information anyway.
Thus, the question in most cases is not whether the claimant must
provide documentation but when. The policy of increasing presuit
settlements, coupled with the fact that any information withheld can
eventually be procured through discovery, indicates that the claimant should provide requested information along with the claim.
A second, more fundamental objection to theAdams court's reliance on the fairness policy is that Congress did not intend fairness to
mean that claimants need not document their claims. A careful reading of the Senate Report reveals that Congress considered the
amendments to be "fair and equitable" because the settlement process would reduce the time and expense imposed on private individuals bringing suits against the govemment.54 The Senate Report and
the Hearings state that agencies should be able to handle the claims
of private individuals quickly, particularly if the claims are simple. 55
In fact, the Department of Justice, the agency that requested the bill,
believed that simpler claims could be handled without the aid of
counsel.56 Even an individual who hires an attorney benefits by settling with the agency within six months of filing a claim because the
statutory limit on attorneys' fees is lower during that period than it is
afterward. 57 The fact that Congress made presuit settlement an attractive alternative demonstrates that it intended to promote "fair
and equitable treatment . . . of claimants" by reducing the time and
expense of litigation. Adams incorrectly relied on the fairness policy
to support a minimal notice requirement that might undermine the
goal of expeditious settlement. The better interpretation of the legislative history is that the settlement policy embodied in the FTCA
amendments demands compliance with reasonable agency documentation requests, an issue to which this Note now turns.
to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment."); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC·
(1970).
54. Congress recognized, however, that some complex suits might not be settled. See S.
REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2S 18
("[S]ome difficult tort claims cannot be processed and evaluated in this 6-month period.").
The inferences supported by recognition of this fact are discussed at note 6S infra and accompanying text.
55. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
at 2517. ("[M]eritorious [claims] can be settled more quickly without the need for filing suit
and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation."); Hearings, supra note S, at 15 ("[A
claimant] could [settle) without the bother and cost of litigation."). Congress also knew that
presuit settlement would save the government money. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement
of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) (settlements are "less expensive than judg•
ments"); S. REP. No. 1327,supra note 5, at4,reprintedin 1966 U.S. CooE CONO. &Ao. NEWS
at 2518 (settlement would save the Government "unnecessary" litigation expenses).
56. Hearings,supra note 5, at 13 (Statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) (the "claimant . . . may not need to engage a lawyer'').
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1976) (twenty percent limit for settlements during administrative
proceedings, twenty-five percent limit in all other situations).
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2007
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B. Documenting Claims: Potentialfor Overreaching
In Swffe v. United States, 58 plaintiffs ignored the government's
repeated request to " 'provide [the agency] with the necessary evidence needed in support of a claim for personal injury and death as
specified on the [standard claim] form.' " 59 The district court, recognizing that federal regulations60 grant agencies the authority to request such information, dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction.61
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that allowing
the plaintiff to file suit without first documenting the claim with the
appropriate agency would frustrate the FTCA amendments' policy
of increasing presuit settlements.62
Although Swffe properly requires documentation to encourage
presuit settlements, the opinion is unsatisfactory because it upholds
the Department of Justice regulations in their entirety63 without determining whether they violate the fairness policy of the FTCA
amendments.64 Congress intended the amendments to provide more
equitable treatment of claimants by reducing the time and expense
of filing claims against the government.65 It did not, however, intend
the administrative claim procedure to prejudice a claimant's ability
to litigate if settlement negotiations proved fruitless. 66
58. 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980).
59. 614 F.2d at 813.
60. See note 18 supra.
61. See 614 F.2d at 814.
62. 614 F.2d at 814; see note 21 supra.
63. See 614 F.2d at 814-15.
64. See notes 25 & 45-46supra and accompanying text (discussing fairness policy ofFTCA
amendments).
65. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
66. Congress did not expressly consider the limits that should be imposed on an agency's
authority to request documentation. Instead, it indicated that the amendments would promote
fair treatment of claimants by expediting the process of filing claims against the government.
See notes 45-46 & 54-57 supra and accompanying text. Congress's silence concerning the
permissible extent of documentation requests necessitates an inquiry into how Congress would
have limited documentation had it considered the issue. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF TIIE LAW 165 (1909).
Several factors indicate that Congress would have prevented documentation requests from
prejudicing a claimant's ability to seek recourse in the courts. First, statements in the legislative history support this conclusion. Congress anticipated that many claims would not be settled. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2518-19. Moreover, Congress wanted claimants to have the option of filing suit. See id. at
6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2520. Because Congress knew that
administrative proceedings would not resolve all disputes, it would not have sanctioned a documentation requirement that might prejudice claimant's case or prevent him from suing altogether.
Second, an analysis of the FTCA's original purpose lends further support to this conclusion. Congress enacted the FTCA in part to extend "to injured parties . . . recovery as a
matter of right." S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); see also Note, The Federal
Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE LJ. 534, 534-35 (1947) (discussing reasons for enacting the FTCA).
In amending the FTCA to establish an administrative claim requirement, Congress never expressed an intention to prejudice the right to trial it had previously created. Therefore, Con-
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Current Justice Department regulations prejudice claimants in
three ways. First, they fail to advise the claimant about the information that an agency is authorized to demand. 67 Second, the regulations are inconsistent with Standard Form 95,68 the instrument by
which claims are filed. Third, the Justice Department regulations
permit an agency to demand information that it could not obtain if
the parties were conducting discovery. 69 This potential for overgress would not approve of documentation requirements that would impair a claiinant's right
to litigate.
67. The regulations are ambiguous in two respects. First, they state that an agency may
require a claiinant to provide "(a]ny other evidence or information which may have a bearing
on either the responsibility of the United States . . . or the damages claiined." 28 C.F.R.
§ 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6), (c)(5) (1982); see note 18 supra. The breadth of this language arguably
sanctions requests that demand information only tangentially related to the claiin. To date,
however, no case has arisen where a clai.JJlant has challenged a particular request because of its
ambiguity, and Sw!ft does not indicate whether a clai.JJlant would prevail if such challenge
were made.
Second, the regulations imply that compliance with a documentation request is optional
because they state that "the claiinant may he required to submit the following evidence or
information . . . ." 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a), (b), (c) (1982) (emphasis added). The courts have
divided on the phrase's proper interpretation. Compare Tucker v. United States Postal Serv.,
676 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1982) (''That the information designated in 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 is
intended for (settlement] purpose[s], and not as a prerequisite to the satisfaction of the timely
filing requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b), is confirmed by the permissive language 'may be
required to submit.'") (emphasis in original) with Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266,
1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Unfortunately, plaintiffs put the emphasis on the wrong word. The
regulation provides that such information 'may be required.'") (emphasis in original). Thus,
the regulations do not clearly apprise claiinants of the information an agency may permissibly
require. As a consequence, clai.JJlants may view agency documentation requests with a suspi•
cion that will undermine the mutual trust needed to settle prior to suit. q: H. BAER & A.
BRODER, How TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CASES FOR SETTLEMENT 91 (1973); P. HER•
MANN, supra note 48, at 160. The Justice Department could eliminate this problem by stating
specific documentation requirements in its regulations and in Standard Form 95. See Appendix A; note 98 infra.
68. Standard Form 95 warns that "[f]ailure to completely execute this form or to supply
the requested information within two years from the date the allegations accrued may render
your clai.JJl 'invalid.'" Standard Form 95, Back (Rev. 6-78); see Appendix A. Standard Form
95 is thus consistent with Sw!ft in that it demands compliance with agency documentation
requests. In contrast, the Justice Department regulations require that a claimant must execute
"Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident," 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1982)
(emphasis added), thus implying that Adams-type minimal notice will suffice. The phrase
"other written notification" has generated considerable confusion. Compare Odin v. United
States, 656 F.2d 798, 803 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (deferring ''to the Justice Department's interpretation of its own regulations," court stated that a defective Standard Form 95, when combined with information in letters from plaintiff, her attorney, and her physician, constituted
"other written notification") and Dillon v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 862, 863 (D.S.D. 1979)
(the court relied on this phrase to justify plaintifi's failure to include in her administrative
clai.JJl the allegation that an operation was performed without informed consent) with Mudlo v.
United States, 423 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1976) ("if one wants to make a claiin not on
the usual form, then the claiinant had better make sure that the claiin provides the necessary
information to indicate the basis for the demand").
69. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6), (c)(5) (1982). ("claiinant may be required to submit
. . . [a]ny other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the responsibility
of the United States . . . or the damages clai.JJled"); see also 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(b)(l) (1982)
(requiring physical or mental examination, if so requested); note 18 supra.
Congress probably envisioned that documentation requirements would be consistent with
the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Senate Report observed
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reaching could jeopardize the private individual's ability to file suit
on a claim.70 by allowing the government to circumvent the carefully
that "80 percent [of tort cases] are settled prior to trial," S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2517, and expressed no intention to alter
this result by expanding discovery authority under the administrative claim requirement. Cf.
Jacoby, supra note 43, at 1215 ("Formerly, when suit was necessary . . . the broad discovery
procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . were frequently employed . . . .").
Congress probably designed the amendments to improve the timing of, and not the number of,
settlements. Thus, the legislative history does not express a congressional intent to expand the
scope of discovery in administrative claim proceedings.
70. By allowing an agency to request "[a]ny other evidence or information which may
have a bearing on either the responsibility of the United States . . . or the damages claimed,"
28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6), (c)(S) (1982) (emphasis added), the Justice Department regulations permit the government to demand information that is subject to an absolute or qualified
privilege. In contrast, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) protects attorney work product. To discover
documents and other tangibles in anticipation of litigation, the party seeking discovery must
show that he has a "substantial need" for the material, and that he cannot, without undue
hardship, obtain a substantial equivalent by other means. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d
326, 334 (8th Cir. 1977); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 53, at§ 2025. Work product
that includes conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation receives even
greater protection. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981) ("[f]orcing
an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses' oral statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney's mental processes"); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073,
1079 (4th Cir. 1981) (''while the protection of opinion work product is not absolute, only extraordinary circumstances requiring disclosure permit piercing the work product doctrine"),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct 1632 (1982); Walker v. United Parcel Servs., 87 F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B) provides qualified protection to facts known and
opinions held by experts not expected to testify. A party may discover such information only
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Hoover v. United States, 611 F.2d
1132, 1142 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980) (party seeking such disclosure carries a heavy burden); United
States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 372-73 (E.D. Mich. 1971); 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 53, at § 2033; see generally Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating lo Discovery of Experts and Attorney's
Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REV. I 145 (1971).
While not specifically protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a third category
of information universally recognized as nondiscoverable consists of the confidential communications between attorney and client 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 53, at§ 2017;
see, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1978) ("long established
rule that confidential communications between an attorney and his client are absolutely privileged from disclosure against the will of the client"); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545,548 (8th
Cir. 1972) (l>er curiam) ("It is a fundamental "tenet of the law of evidence that, generally,
communications between attorney and client are privileged and not subject to compelled disclosure.").
Obviously, agencies should at no time be allowed to request information that is subject to
an absolute privilege. On the other hand, information subject to qualified privilege may be
crucial to settlement prospects. However, an unqualified right to obtain this information circumvents the careful balance of interests expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A hearing to determine if an agency actually had a "substantial need" to obtain certain
information might preserve the balance of procedural interests, but would increase ancillary
judicial proceedings required to determine whether requested information fell within a particular rule of privilege, as well as whether the request itself satisfied the "substantial need"
requirement Ancillary proceedings might also create an atmosphere hostile to settlement prospects.
The proposal advanced in this Note requires that courts preclude ancillary procedures having to do with an agency's "substantial need" until the claimant files suit. This approach has
two advantages. First, it limits presuit proceedings to issues going to whether the requested
information is privileged. Second, and more important, such a rule balances discovery powers
between claimants and agencies. Because claimants cannot use the Freedom of Information
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tailored balance of competing interests contained in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the regulations violate the fairness
,Policy by impairing a claimant's ability to litigate his claim if negotiations prove unsuccessful.
While Sw!ft correctly promotes the settlement policy of the
FTCA amendments, it fails to accommodate the FTCA's other policy objective - fair treatment of claimants - by upholding the Department of Justice regulations.71 Because neither Sw!ft nor Adams
accommodates the competing interests of the FTCA amendments,
the next section of this Note proposes a proper balance.
Ill.

BALANCING THE COMPETING POLICIES OF THE
.AMENDMENTS

1966

Documentation of claims facilitates settlements. The sooner an
agency receives the presuit information necessary to evaluate a
claim, the sooner serious settlement negotiations can take place. 72
Moreover, a documentation requirement discourages claimants from
submitting inflated claims, which only hamper settlement prospects.73 Finally, many documentation requests are patently reasonable because they enable the agency to obtain information that the
claimant either already possesses or can easily acquire. 74
However, an agency should not use documentation requests as a
subterfuge to dismiss otherwise valid claims. The requests should
not prejudice a subsequent suit should settlement negotiations prove
fruitless. 75 Moreover, the agency should request specific information
because ambiguous requests prevent even diligent claimants from
knowing whether they have provided all the requested
information.76
To balance the competing fairness and settlement policies of the
FTCA amendments, courts should hold that the statute of limitations tolls when the claimant files a Standard Form 95 or provides
Act to obtain privileged information even if they can show a "substantial need" for it, the
government should not be allowed to secure similarly privileged information through documentation requests. To do otherwise would be to give one potential litigant an unfair settlement advantage. See notes 85-88 infra and accompanying text.
11. See Note, supra note 18, at 521.
12. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
13. See H. BAER & A. BRODER, supra note 67, at 81 ("Defendant's representative is not
predisposed to negotiate against a ridiculously high demand."); H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, THE
LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR 224 (1977) ("(A] defense attorney should never make a settlement
unless the investigation file contains sufficient information to support the amount which is
being paid."); P. HERMANN, supra note 48, at 41 ("Nothing gets negotiation off to a poorer
start than a ridiculous demand or offer . . . .").
14. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 66 & 70 supra and accompanying text.
16. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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equivalent information within the two year limitation period.77
However, if a claimant subsequently fails to comply within a reasonable time with an agency's unambiguous78 requests for information
discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,79 the statute of limitations should begin to run again. Information provided
within a reasonable time should relate back to the initial filing. 80
This proposal properly accommodates the two competing policies of the 1966 FTCA amendments. Requiring claimants to comply
with documentation requests enables the agency to obtain the information it needs to evaluate claims and begin settlement negotiations. 81 Demanding that agencies make specific requests minimizes
the possibility that claimants will be unable to determine whether
they have complied. 82 Finally, limiting requests to those that satisfy
the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ensures that claimants will not be prejudiced should they choose to
77. This standard is consistent with theAdams minimal notice requirement. See notes 2427 & 30-32 supra and accompanying text; cf. Apollo v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 137, 139
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (allowing a timely claim that failed to meet sum certain requirement to be
amended after the statute of limitations had run); Note, supra note 18, at 531-34 (proposing a
factor test to determine what information is required to notify an agency of a claim).
78. To comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an agency's documentation request should be specific. See FED. R. Crv. P. 33 (interrogatories); Jewish Hosp. Assn. v. Struck
Constr. Co., 77 F.R.D. 59, 60 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (plaintiff not required to answer interrogatory
question that is ambiguous and calls for a legal conclusion); Struthers Scientific & Intl. Corp.
v. General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (''Though technical precision in
the phrasing of interrogatories is not demanded, something more is required than the vague
phraseology used here.") (footnote omitted); Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.RD. 225, 227
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (interrogatory "calling for a recitation of all information the defendant possesses 'relating to the accident' is entirely too broad to permit an effective response"); Stovall v.
Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 30 F.R.D. 152, 154 (S.D. Tex. 1961) ("Any interrogatory which is too
general and all-inclusive need not be answered.").
79. FED. R. Crv. P. 26, 34-36 properly limit the agency's authority to request supporting
documentation. These rules allow discovery of the types of information already listed in 28
C.F.R. §§ 14.1-14.11 (1982) and the type of documentation available to claimants through the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See notes 86-88 i'!fra and accompanying text. The
other discovery rules involve depositions. Because these devices are very expensive and unavailable to claimants through the FOIA, neither party should be permitted to use them during
administrative proceedings.
80. See Apollo v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 137, 139 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (applying relation
back theory to cure defective claim).
8 •. See, e.g., Swift v. United States, 614 F.2d at 814 ("[C]ounsel's failure to document the
personal injury part of the administrative claim precluded the agency from evaluating the
entire claim for settlement purposes."); Haynes v. United States, No. 81 C 2341 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
2, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("Allowing a claimant to ignore a
proper request for supporting materials and to then file a claim in federal court, would prohibit
meaningful agency evaluation of the claim and would subvert the purposes of Section
2675(a)."); Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("[T]he Government, at a minimum, is entitled to sufficient information to enable it to evaluate the claim and choose between settlement and litigation."); Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 17 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (''their failure to
furnish information on damages absolutely foreclosed the government from arriving at a reasonable settlement figure"); see also notes 50-53 & 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 67 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying note 76 supra.
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litigate their claims. 83 This approach provides the ager1cy with the
same information it would obtain through discovery, but allows it to
demand the documentation before suit so that prompt settlement negotiations can take place. 84
A claimant will also be able to evaluate his claim. 85 An injured
party has two avenues for obtaining information from the government. First, he can simply request the information from the agency.
Second, should the agency prove uncooperative, the claimant can
compel disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 86
Although the scope of discovery under the FOIA is not as broad as
that available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 87 discovery opportunities are not so disparate that the government will enjoy
a significant advantage over the plaintiff during presuit negotia83. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
84. This result is consistent with congressional intent to expedite settlements. See S. REP,
No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Cooe CONG. & Ao. News at 2517 (FTCA
amendments designed to help settle meritorious claims "more quickly").
85. Settlements rarely occur until each party knows the strengths and weaknesses of the
other's case. See, e.g., H. BAER & A. BRODER,supra note 67, at 91 ("It is impossible to emphasize strongly enough the role of disclosure in facilitating settlement. Free and open exchange
of information generates mutual confidence, and this in tum creates the atmosphere out of
which successful settlements are negotiated."); P. HERMANN, supra note 48, at 160 ("Probably
the greatest roadblock in the way of advantageous settlement of personal injury claims is failure of the opposing sides to furnish information to each other. It is like trying to sell a product
without disclosing much about it."). This observation applies to presuit administrative settlement because a claimant is not likely to settle his case without knowing the viability of the
government's defenses. See Jacoby, supra note 43, at 1215 ("The limited opportunities for [the
claimant to conduct] discovery ... may diminish the frequency of administrative settlements
. . . ."). Congress did not, however, consider the effect that one-way discovery would have on
the settlement process. See id. at 1217 n.29 ("The brieflegislative history ... does not contain
any discussion of the difficulties of discovery in the required administrative process."). For a
discussion of the problem of one-way discovery and of possible solutions, see id. at 1215-17,
This Note argues that claimants can use the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain
information needed for settlement evaluation. See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text,
86. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Sections
552(a)(l) and 552(a)(2) require publication or disclosure of agency records, such as rules of
procedure ((a)(l)(C)) and administrative staff manuals ((a)(2)(C)). Claimants most frequently
seek disclosure of agency records through section 552(a)(3):
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of
this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes
such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place,
fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to
any person.
The FOIA is intended to allow private citizens broad access to records maintained by government agencies. See Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345,352 (1982); NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-24 (1978); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 361 (1976); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973).
87. Nine categories of records have been excluded from the Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 5'52(b)
(1976). However, "these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure,
not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. 'These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive' ... and must be narrowly construed." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at
361 (quoting Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 79); accord Chilivis v.
SEC, 673 F.2d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 1982); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F. 2d 662, 665 (8th Cir.
1980).
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tions.88 Moreover, a claimant controls the ultimate weapon against a
88. The FOIA exemption most likely to include records needed by claimants is 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(5) (Exemption 5), which excludes "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an JJ,gency in litigation with
the agency . . . ." The Supreme Court has construed this section to "exempt those documents, and only those documents, normally privileged in the civil discovery context." NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); accord Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975). Specifically, documents covered by Exemption 5
include those that fall within "the attorney-client privilege, . . . the attorney work product
privilege, . . . and the so-called executive, governmental or deliberative process privilege."
Pies v. IRS, 668 F.2d 1350, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1981); accord Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Because the proposal set forth in this
Note would limit an agency's ability to request privileged information, see note 70 supra and
accompanying text, Exemption 5 would not place claimants at a disadvantage relative to the
government.
The most severe limit on the FOIA as a substitute discovery device is that it only applies to
items "on which information is stored." B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§ 9.07[2]; see, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 161-62 (FOIA does
not compel agencies to write opinions or to create explanatory material); Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982); DiVigio v. Kelley, 571 F.2d 538, 542
(10th Cir. 1978). Though the information need not be transcribed into a document, see, e.g.,
Yeager, 678 F.2d at 321 ("computer-stored records . . . are still 'records' for purposes of the
FOIA"); Save the Dolphins v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407,411 (N.D.
Cal. 1975) (movie film is a record), three dimensional items may not be reachable under the
FOIA. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 135 (D. Kan. 1971) (A record is
"[t]hat which is written or transcribed to perpetuate knowledge of act" and does not include
items such as rifle and bullets used to assassinate President Kennedy.), qffd, 460 F.2d 671
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972); Note, The Freedom ofInformation Act-A Potential Alternative to Conventional Criminal Discovery, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73, 99-101 (1976).
But see Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Ieformation Act, 31
STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1095-98 (1979).
The proposal advanced by this Note requires claimants to answer questions posed by agencies. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. Because the stored information limitation
applies to agency records but not to materials possessed by claimants, the government arguably has a better capacity to exercise discovery. This advantage is offset somewhat because,
even as to privileged documents, the FOIA "extend[s] to the discovery of purely factual material appearing in those documents in a form that is severable without compromising the private remainder of the documents." Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91
(1973). Courts applying Mink's distinction between deliberative and factual information, 410
U.S. at 90-92, have protected documents that reveal litigation theories or strategies, see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 421 U.S. 132, 155 (1975), but have ordered production of
those containing purely factual material. See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d
1131, 1138 (4th Cir. 1977) ("facts contained in witnesses' statements of other purely factual
material"); Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 560 (D.D.C. 1981) (handwritten notes prepared
by attorney for use in litigation). In contrast, Rule 26(b}(3) requires a showing of substantial
need before documents "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" are discoverable.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Ultimately, the fact "[t]hat for one reason or another a document may be exempt from discovery does not mean that it will be exempt from a demand
under FOIA." Playboy Enters. v. Department of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Because agency attorneys will not rely very heavily on their memories to store facts relevant to
FTCA claims, claimants should be able to obtain considerable amounts of factual information
through the FOIA.
FOIA discovery may also impose time delays on claimants. See Levine, Using the Freedom
ofInformation Act as a Discovery Device, ~6 Bus. LAW. 45, 46-47 (1980). Toran, Information
Disclosure in Civil Action: The Freedom ofIeformation Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 868-69 (1981). Theoretically, an agency could postpone compliance
to prevent disclosure of its case during administrative proceedings. However, the prospect of
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recalcitrant agency - he can refuse to settle. 89
In fact, a claimant may not need to resort to any sort of presuit
discovery because Congress intended that administrative proceedings would encourage prompt settlement of simpler claims. 90 If the
agency involved admits liability upon conclusion of its internal investigation, it will need documentation only to determine that the
claimant is the proper party to raise the claim and that the damages
sought are accurate. 91 If the resulting award is satisfactory to the
claimant, he will not need to obtain additional information pertinent
to settlement evaluation. Thus, the proposal permits both the claimant and the agency to obtain information needed to investigate settlement options.
One could criticize the approach advanced by this Note by arguing that it will produce ancillary proceedings on two issues: whether
the information requested was discoverable under the Federal
Rules, 92 and whether the plaintiff replied within a reasonable time.
This objection is not without merit because extensive litigation over
presuit settlement, together with an occasional resort to judicial prodding, should provide an
incentive sufficient to expedite processing of FOIA requests.
Finally, claimants seeking information under the FOIA would lose discovery leverage that
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) sometimes provides to parties who show "substantial need." See
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 149 n.16 ("Exemption 5 was intended to permit
disclosure of those intra-agency memoranda which would 'routinely be disclosed' in private
. . . litigation and we accept this as the law." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong,, 2d
Sess. 10 (1966)); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86 ("Nor does the
Act, by its terms, permit inquiry into particularized needs of the individual seeking the information, although such an inquiry would ordinarily be made of a private litigant."). Under this
Note's approach, a claimant would not suffer from this loss of leverage because neither party
could use a "substantial need" proceeding. See note 70 supra.
Thus, although "(d]iscovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of
the Act," Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974), claimants can
use the FOIA to obtain information for settlement evaluation. See Bannercreft Clothing Co.,
415 U.S. at 30 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("That Act, contrary to what the Court says, had as one
of its purposes 'discovery for litigation purposes.' "); Levine, supra, at 55; Toran, supra, at 85965. This Note's proposal, which provides both agencies and claimants with information
needed to evaluate claims, should maximize the FTCA amendments' presuit settlement policy.
89. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG, & Ao.
NEWS at 2520 ("If a satisfactory arrangement cannot be reached in the matter, the claimant
can simply do as he does today - file suit.").
90. Congress acknowledged that "some difficult tort claims . . • cannot be processed and
evaluated in this 6-month period," S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2518, but envisioned that agencies would be able to settle simple, meritorious claims quickly. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at
2517.
91. Congress arguably anticipated that the administrative claim procedure would work in
this manner. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Cool! CONG, &
Ao. NEWS at 2517.
92. Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Since the claims presentation requirement is jurisdictional, if it were interpreted to require more than minimal notice,
there would be, inevitably, hearings on ancillary matters of fact whenever the agency rejected
a claim as incomplete.").
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a standard that tolls the statute of limitation would undermine the
rule by making it uncertain.
The ancillary proceedings concern is not compelling for three
reasons. First, communication between agency officials and claimants during the administrative process will enable potential plaintiffs
to clarify some ambiguous documentation requests, 93 thus eliminating the need for judicial proceedings. Second, attorneys can avoid
ancillary disputes about the propriety of particular documentation
requests by examining cases that interpret the discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 94 Finally, the only alternative to the approach proposed by this Note is a documentation standard that rigidly de.fines the sort of information that an agency can
request. But a bright line rule has other disadvantages. Sw!fl draws
a line favoring presuit settlement but fails to promote the FTCA
amendments' fairness policy;95 the Adams minim~l notice rule, on
the other hand, favors fairness at the expense of settlement96 and
produces no more certainty than this Note's approach because it requires only that the notice be "sufficient to enable the agency to in93. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1982) (several
letters from government to claimant); Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussions between Navy and claimant's attorney); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445,
447 (6th Cir. 1981) (fourteen letters between parties).
94. This Note criticizes the Justice Department regulations, which currently give agencies
the authority to request documentation, but it does not argue that agencies cannot make such
requests in specific cases. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery
of medical reports. See FED. R. Crv. P. 34(a); Fleming v. Gardner, 84 F.R.D. 217,218 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978) (emergency room records concerning hospitalization and treatment); Flora v.
Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576,580 (M.D. N.C. 1978) (records of psychiatric exam conducted some
fifteen years earlier); Mattson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 43 F.R.D. 523, 526 (N.D. Ohio 1967)
(hospital and physicians' records). This right to discover medical records is not limited by Rule
35, which governs physical and mental examinations. FED. R. C1v. P. 35(b)(3) (rule "does not
preclude discovery of a report of an examining physician . . . in accordance with the provisions of any other rule"); see, e.g., Buffington v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1965) (Rule
35 is merely a method to avoid having to show cause to discover medical reports. It was not
intended to be the exclusive method for medical report exchange.); Hughes v. Groves, 47
F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D. Mo. 1969) ("Relevant hospital records appear in any personal injury case
to be subject to production for 'good cause shown.' . . . Rule 35, however, may not pre-empt
production of reports under Rule 34 . . . ."); Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D. Md.
1961) ("Rule 35 does not prevent a plaintiff or a defendant from obtaining an order under
Rule 34 requiring the opposite party to produce and to permit the inspection and copying of
medical reports and hospital records, unless such reports and records are privileged."); cf. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 460 F. Supp. 150, 151 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (''This Court has been unable
to locate a case which recognizes a federal common law physician-patient privilege."); Hardy
v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (''There is no federally-created physicianpatient privilege."). This Note's approach would permit documentation requests seeking
claimant medical records because such requests would be allowed under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. q: Avery v. United States Postal Serv., 680 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1982)
(medical reports); Tucker v. United States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 956 (3d Cir. 1982) (itemized medical bills); Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D. Iowa 1981) (medical reports).
·
95. See notes 62-71 supra and accompanying text
96. See notes 47-57 supra and accompanying text
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vestigate."97 The Justice Department could conceivably promote
both policies with bright line regulations, 98 but this option offers no
guidance to courts defining the claim requirement under current regulations. Thus, courts must choose between a standard that offers a
bright line test but fails to promote simultaneously the two policies
underlying the FTCA and one that advances both policies but produces ancillary proceedings on the meaning of its terms. Because the
prospect of additional proceedings will be minimized by resort to
existing interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
by communications between claimants and agencies, the courts
should adopt a standard that furthers both policies of the FTCA
amendments.
CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that plaintiffs are often denied an opportunity to
have the merits of their claims considered because of their failure to
comply with documentation requests. 99 Although Congress imposed
an administrative claim requirement, it failed to define the term.
97. 615 F.2d at 289; see Note, supra note 18, at 531.
98. Consistent regulations with specific documentation requirements will promote both
policies underlying the 1966 amendments. With only a few modifications, the present regulations could be made acceptable. First, the requirements listed in section 14.4 should be consistent with the list on the back of the Standard Form 95. See notes 18 & 68 supra and
accompanying text; Appendix A. Because many claimants see only Standard Form 95, the
affected agency should not jeopardize settlement prospects by making additional requests, For
claimants who see both the regulations and Standard Form 95, complete consistency can only
reduce confusion, again creating a better settlement environment.
Second, sections 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6) and (c)(5) should be eliminated from the regulations.
See notes 67 & 69 supra and accompanying text. These ambiguous sections are currently open
to abuse. After handling thousands of tort cases, government agencies and the Attorney General must know which documents are needed to settle the vast majority of each type of claim.
The settlement prospects of claims unusual enough to require special information should be
sacrificed for the sake of clarity. This result is not unreasonable because Congress realized that
some claims would be too complicated to settle in an administrative setting. See note 90 supra.
Justice Department regulations that specifically identify the documentation required of claimants would preclude agency demands for nondiscoverable information. See notes 69-70 supra
and accompanying text. As the body of case law involving challenges to specific requirements
grows, the number of ancillary proceedings to determine the propriety of agency demands will
decrease. If the Justice Department eliminates these regulations and harmonizes Standard
Form 95 with section 14.4, it would eliminate the need for a relation back doctrine. See note
80 supra and accompanying text. Standard Form 95 and the regulations would then provide
claimants with notice of exactly what information would be required to toll the statute of
limitations.
Finally, the new regulation should clearly state that a claimant must submit the information required by section 14.4 and by Standard Form 95 within the statutory period in order to
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 2675(a). Section 14.2(a) should state that the
claim must consist of an executed Standard Form 95 and the documentation it requires, or any
other writing that provides the same information and documentation. This approach would
eliminate the confusion created by the word "notification." See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
99. Many of these cases admittedly evoke sympathy for the claimant. See, e.g., Adams v.
United States, 615 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1980) (brain damaged child); Rothman v. United States,
434 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (wrongful death of son).
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Relying on the legislative history, the Adams and Sw!ft courts have
attempted to explain the claim requirement, but each failed to balance the competing policies that caused Congress to enact the administrative claim provision. The Department of Justice could
remedy the situation by introducing new regulations, 100 but it has
failed to act.
This Note offers a solution that, unlike the approaches adopted
in Adams and Sw!ft, promotes both the settlement and fairness policies of the FTCA amendments: toll the statute of limitations upon
the filing of the Standard Form 95 or its equivalent, but make plaintiffs comply with all unambiguous documentation requests that satisfy the discovery standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The proposal will admittedly engender ancillary proceedings, but
their number will be minimized by claimant communication with
affected agencies and by existing precedent. Thus, while the proposed solution may not be entirely satisfactory, it represents the best
available alternative.

100. See note 98 supra.
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Fine ur nnl roo1c lhJn S IO,CHM) ur lmrrhunmcnl r11r nul more
lh.,n $ Y<Jr. ur l>ulh. IJ,r ~1 S1111. bV,~. NV, IN U.\ C'.181, 100/.1

June 1983]
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APPENDIX A
STANDARD FORM 95-REVERSE
./

PRIVACY ACT NOTICE
This Notiu b provid:d in ~-cord&ncc with lhe Privacy Act. S U.S C.
5Sb{t)l'l), and conccnu the i.::irormadoo rrquntcd in 1hc lctkf to which 1hm
Nut~ Is auachcd.

~:~wi~ rn~~lz~is~tc~~:~ ~~~U.J~ 2~1°:,":': r:
1

A.

Cl'R.14.l.

B. Pri11tlpi,l ru,JttW: The information reqUtUcd it to be u,ed in eva!u.alin&
clalm•

°"

C. Routbi,

(fu-.
~ ltic: Notkcs of Systems of Records ror the aacncy lo
whom )'llU .... ,•1't1"1iUinJ lhis ronn for Ibis iDfOrm&ltOA.

rt',~ RrT;,,,nd: Dl,closurc is voluntary. However. (adure lo
!if!Y-:!:!,.t!-'·intcJ inrormalion or 10 cs.ccuu the Conn may render your

D. Flfttt oJ Fa,'•

INSTRUCTIONS
Complote all ltom1-ln1ort the word NONE where appllcablo
C1tims ro, d&mJ.&c to or ror !ow. or dntructlOa or property, or for pc:rl<lftaJ
lnJU'J, m11SI bit si&,ned by 1hc ownu or the rrorc-r11 damaged or Ion or 1hc

=~:.~:;,.n:;-.:;
~~=!~l
f~1~~1:,d:~:~r~!1'~!n~~ r~ffiii'~
I~
beby•

claim ~r
fikd
duly au1honzcd a1,n1 ,,r otMr IC',:al IC'J'l~l:ztivr.
11,nvickJ CVldCftC'C t.1lisfacl1>ry In 1hc- Gn,c-1nmail is MJbtniUC'd with sa~ cbi:Q
nubh,hin& authoti1y to act.

c~{~~~~tl~

•~i:,.:~:~ori::h ro':r~ni~~~~%1::,~

J'C~Zt ~~T~WnuJc :t:,iafJ'~1~mpctcnt evidence as
(,il:~}~ supJ10rl vf cWm ror rmonaJ injury or Jealh. lhc cl~manl sh.:ultJ 1ubmit

a "'nllirn rcpon by 1he ancnding rhy«ian. shawina 1hc nalurc and c&tent or
1nJury. 1b(o ru1urc anJ c11en1 or 1re~1n~at. 1b(o Jqrcc ar pcrmanenl duabtli1y. 1r
an), I~ proanmk. and d-.c pcr4.J u(hMr4:1ah11non. or incaraciution. ~nacluna,
unmraJ bills for maJK"aJ, ho)pital. or burial e1pcm.('S QctuaUy inc1:rrcd.

-- ..

~~ic~rr:'1ep.J~~.aj,.:! !f:i~!n~:O~l::J:~>'.:i= .~ :.:, ~"~

sblc:menb or cs1ima1cs by rc:h11b1c:, dWntcr«icd concerns. o,. ,r pay~nl hu
bttn i:iwfe. lhc llcmizC'd siglltd rC\."ClpU evidencing pa)'mtnl.
(d 1a suprort
cJa1ms for damagr to propcny \1/hkb is Dot ecunomintly
r1:par•b!c, or 1f the property 1s lost or dcs110ycd 0 lhc cWmfflt s.hould submit
statrmenls as 10 lhe original cost the propmy. lhc: 1U1e or purctwc-. and lhe
value oflhc rropt,ty, botb before ar.d after the accidtuL Such stat.:mmu lhould
be by disin1crC'Skd competent pusons. preferably reputable ffl?crs or orriciah
ramilw with the l)'pt: of {)tOpcrty dam.aged, or by IWO Of CIOl'e competitive
bidden. and lhould be ccrt1licd u bein~ jusl and corm:t.
Any ful1htt i1mNCtions or inronnat1on riccc:ssuy in the prcpuahoa or your
daim 'Nill be furnished. upon rcquol. by the omec indicated in item #I on the
reverse Ude.
{d) F~urc 10 compk1dy cucu1c Ibis form or lo supply 1he requested ma1ffll1
wilhin two years rrom the dale lhe aUeaaiions accrued m,y render your clwn
""anva1id'".

or

or

INSURANCE COVERAGE

----------·--··----·--· -·-----

In 111J"·1 1h.11 ,uhn1i:-11iun 1-.l.1inh m.1) he .l\ljuJi1:.11c,I. ii" 1.·,,cn1i.1I lh:111hc cl.aim.ml i,r,1\·i1lc lhc follm\ing inrurmJtion n:l!,,1rJin,; th-: in,ur-Jnce
1.11\i:r.1~«: 11( 111, ,chide ,,r (11\l!"rly.

17 00 YOU CARlcY ACCIO(Nt INSURAUC£? l I YlS, If YlS. CIVf NM\t ANO ADDRESS Of INSURANCE COMPANY IN11111bu. Jtrr1·1. cil\,!il1llr. u11J
/111 (",,,/1•J AND POLICY NUMBER [I NO

18 HAVl YOU lll(O CIAlt.\ ON YOUR INSURANCE CARRIER IN THIS INSTANCE. AND If SO. IS IT

19 If OEDUC11BL£. SJAT£ Al,\OUNf

IUll COVERAGE OR DlOUCIIBlE?

,o

IF CLAIM HAS BUN FIUO Wl1H YOUR CARRIER. \.'/HAT ACTION HAS YOUR INSURER TAKEN OR PROPOSES TO TAKE WHH RlFERENCE TO YOUR
CIAIM,? I/I 11 11,·1.-,u,r,- 1lt11I ,-,,1111u1•1111i,111,,·,,· f,111,1

21 DO "rOU CARRY PUBUC UABllltY AND PROP£R1Y DAMAGE INSURANCE? 0 YES. IF YES, GIVE NAME ANO ADDRESS OF INSURANCE CARRlfR 1.\'111111•1·1. ,11,•,·1. till·• •\lcltr. ,mJ 711• C,,,l,•J ONO

*Gl'0,1071 0-2~1511

